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Abstract
Verifying security properties of deep neural networks (DNNs)
is becoming increasingly important. This paper introduces a
new quantitative verification framework for DNNs that can
decide, with user-specified confidence, whether a given logical
property ψ defined over the space of inputs of the given DNN
holds for less than a user-specified threshold, θ. We present
new algorithms that are scalable to large real-world models as
well as proven to be sound. Our approach requires only black-
box access to the models. Further, it certifies properties of both
deterministic and non-deterministic DNNs. We implement
our approach in a tool called PROVERO.
We apply PROVERO to the problem of certifying adversar-
ial robustness. In this context, PROVERO provides an attack-
agnostic measure of robustness for a given DNN and a test
input. First, we find that this metric has a strong statistical
correlation with perturbation bounds reported by 2 of the
most prominent white-box attack strategies today. Second, we
show that PROVERO can quantitatively certify robustness with
high confidence in cases where the state-of-the-art qualitative
verification tool (ERAN) fails to produce conclusive results.
Thus, quantitative verification scales easily to large DNNs.
1 Introduction
The past few years have witnessed an increasing adoption of
deep neural networks (DNNs) in domains such as autonomous
vehicles [4,28,42], drones [20] or robotics [15,55], where mis-
predictions can have serious long-term consequences. Con-
sequently, robustness, privacy, and fairness have emerged as
central concerns to be addressed for safe adoption of DNNs.
This has led to a surge of interest in testing and verification
of neural networks for properties of interest.
To establish that the resulting DNNs have the desired prop-
erties, a large body of prior work has focused on techniques
based on empirical testing [43, 46, 54] or specialized attack
vectors [1, 29, 34, 38, 49]. While such techniques are useful,
they do not rigorously quantify how sure we can be that the
desired property is true after testing.
In contrast to prior testing approaches, formal verification
seeks to provide rigorous guarantees of correctness. Inspired
by the success of model checking in the context of hard-
ware and software verification, the earliest formal verification
methodologies in the context of deep neural networks focused
on qualitative verification, i.e., whether a system satisfies a
given specification. Prior work in this category has been fol-
lowing the model checking paradigm wherein a given DNN
is encoded as a model using constraints grounded in a chosen
theory. Then a satisfiability solver (often modulo the chosen
theory) is invoked to check if there exists an execution of the
system that violates the given specification [13, 22, 31, 35].
The proposed techniques in this category appear to have
three limitations. Firstly, they require white-box access to the
models and specialized procedures to transform the DNNs to
a specification, limiting their generality. Secondly, the perfor-
mance of the underlying feasibility solver degrades severely
with the usage of non-linear constraints, leading to analyses
that do not scale to larger models. Thirdly, prior techniques
are limited to deterministic neural networks, while extensive
research effort has been invested in designing randomized
DNNs, especially to enhance robustness [10, 11, 26].
Such qualitative verification considers only two scenarios:
either a DNN satisfies the property, or it does not. However,
neural networks are stochastically trained, and more impor-
tantly, they may run on inputs drawn from an unknown distri-
bution at inference time. Properties of interest are thus often
probabilistic and defined over an input distribution (e.g., dif-
ferential privacy and fairness). Hence, qualitative verification
is not suitable for such properties.
An alternative approach is to check how often a property
is satisfied by a given DNN under a given input distribution.
More specifically, one can assert that a DNN satisfies a prop-
erty ψ with a desirably high probability 1−δ. Unlike ad-hoc
testing, quantitative verification [2] aims to provide sound-
ness, i.e., when it confirms that ψ is true with probability p,
then the claim can be rigorously deduced from the laws of
probability. For many practical applications, knowing that the
chance of failure is controllably small suffices for deployment.
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For instance, it has been suggested that road safety standards
for self-driving cars specify sufficiently low failure rates of
the perceptual sub-systems, against which implementations
can be verified [21, 24, 45]. Further, we show the role of
quantitative verification in the specific context of adversarial
robustness (see Section 2.1).
In this paper, we present a new quantitative verification
algorithm for DNNs called PROVERO, tackling the following
problem: Given a logical property ψ specified over a space
of inputs and outputs of a DNN and a numerical threshold θ,
decide whether ψ is true for less than θ fraction of the inputs.
PROVERO is a procedure that achieves the above goal with
proven soundness: When it halts with a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ decision,
it is correct with probability 1−δ and within approximation
error η to the given θ. The verifier can control the desired
parameters (η,δ), making them arbitrarily close to zero. That
is, the verifier can have controllably high certainty about the
verifier’s output, and θ can be arbitrarily precise (or close to
the ground truth). The lower the choice of (η,δ) used by the
verifier, the higher is the running time.
PROVERO is based on sampling, and it makes only one
assumption—the ability to take independent samples from
the space over which ψ is defined1. This makes the verifi-
cation procedure considerably general and stand-alone. The
verifier only needs black-box access to the DNN, freeing it
up from assuming anything about the internal implementa-
tion of the DNNs. The DNN can be deterministic or from
a general family of non-deterministic DNNs. This allows
checking probabilistic properties of deterministic DNNs and
of randomization procedures defined over DNNs.
Results. We demonstrate that PROVERO has practical util-
ity for certifying adversarial robustness. Suppose the prover
claims that a DNN has at most 10−3 adversarial inputs in a
certain space of inputs (e.g., in the Lp(ε, I) ball of a given
image I). PROVERO provides a procedure that can verify the
prover’s claim that the true ratio of adversarial examples is
upper bounded by a quantity θ (e.g., 10
−3
|Lp(ε,I)| ) with arbitrarily
high precision, and with arbitrarily high certainty.
Based on this capability, we show a new metric of robust-
ness called adversarial hardness, which can be computed
using PROVERO with only black-box access. Adversarial hard-
ness is an attack-agnostic metric for comparing the robustness
of (say) two DNNs on a given input. We find that this metric
is strongly correlated with the efficacy of today’s most promi-
nent white-box attacks (c.f. PGD [29] and C&W [8]) on over
38 DNNs, including large ones such as ResNet and Inception.
Both these white-box attacks very often do better when adver-
sarial hardness metric is low and worse when it is high. This
connection suggests that, when comparing DNN robustness,
future evaluation of robustness could use adversarial hardness
as a quantitative attack-agnostic metric, complementing the
1For non-deterministic DNNs, the procedure assumes that the randomiza-
tion used for the DNN is independent of its specific input.
existing use of attacks.
Second, PROVERO scales to large DNNs. We compare
PROVERO to ERAN [39], presently the most scalable state-
of-the-art qualitative verification tool. We find that ERAN
does not scale to large models (e.g., VGG16 on ImageNet),
for which PROVERO quantitatively verifies in 2000 seconds.
For smaller models where ERAN terminates, it often does
not conclusively certify the absence of adversarial examples
above small perturbation size (e.g., 0.03 on MNIST with L∞
norm). PROVERO quantitatively certifies with high certainty
for these models within a comparable running time. This
explains how quantitative verification can complement quali-
tative verification by generating sound and high-confidence
certificates, especially in cases where qualitative analysis fails
to provide any conclusive results.
Lastly, PROVERO can quantitatively verify deterministic
DNNs as well as randomized DNNs having only black-box
access. As a case study, we demonstrate PROVERO on models
that internally use randomization to improve as suggested in
PixelDP [26]. PROVERO’s quantitative results are consistent
with the qualitative robustness certificates that PixelDP itself
generates. Further, we can calculate the adversarial hardness
metric: the largest perturbation bound below which the model
has very low adversarial example density (i.e. θ≤ 10−2) using
PROVERO. We find that adversarial hardness in the PixelDP
model is 5× larger than its qualitatively certified bounds.
Contributions. We claim the following contributions:
• We present a new quantitative verification algorithm
for neural networks. The framework is fairly general:
It assumes only black-box access to the model being
verified, and assumes only the ability to sample from the
input distribution over which the property is asserted.
• We implement our approach in a tool called PROVERO
that embodies sound algorithms and scales quantita-
tive verification for adversarial robustness to large real-
world DNNs, both deterministic and randomized, within
1 hour.
• In the context of certifying adversarial robustness, our
empirical evaluation presents a new attack-agnostic mea-
sure of robustness and shows that PROVERO can produce
certificates with high confidence on instances where ex-
isting state-of-the-art qualitative verification does not
provide conclusive results.
2 Application: Adversarial Robustness
For concreteness, we apply our approach to verifying the
robustness of neural networks. In proving robustness, the
analyst has to provide a space of inputs over which the ro-
bustness holds. Often, this space is defined by all inputs
that are within a perturbation bound ε of a given input x
in the Lp norm [16]. Different distance norms have been
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used such as L0, L1, L2 and L∞. The Lp norm is defined as
‖x−x′‖p = (|x′1− x1|p + |x′2− x2|p + . . .+ |x′n− xn|p)1/p. A
neural network f is defined to be robust with respect to a given
input x if ∀x′ such that ‖x−x′‖p < ε, we have f (x) = f (x′).
For a given neural network f and input point x, there always
exists some perturbation size beyond which there are one or
more adversarial samples. We refer to this minimum perturba-
tion with non-zero adversarial examples as εmin, which is the
ground truth the security analyst wants to know. Attack proce-
dures are best-effort methods which find upper bounds for εmin
but cannot provably show that these bounds are tight [1,7,48].
Verification procedures aim to prove the absence of adver-
sarial examples below a given bound, i.e., they can establish
lower bounds for εmin. We call such verified lower bounds
εver f . Most verifiers proposed to date for robustness checking
are qualitative, i.e., given a perturbation size εver f , they output
whether adversarial examples are absent within εver f . If the
verification procedure is sound and outputs ‘Yes’, then it is
guaranteed that there are no adversarial examples within εver f ,
i.e., the robustness property is satisfied. When the verifier says
‘No’, if the verifier is complete, then it is guaranteed that there
are indeed adversarial examples within εver f . If the verifier is
incomplete and prints ‘No’, the result is inconclusive.
Let us introduce a simple quantitative measure of robust-
ness called the adversarial density. Adversarial density is the
fraction of inputs around a given input x which are adversarial
examples. We explain why adversarial density is a practically
useful quantity and much easier to compute for large DNNs
than εmin. We can compute perturbation bounds below which
the adversarial density is non-zero but negligibly small, and
we empirically show these bounds are highly correlated with
estimates of εmin obtained by state-of-the-art attack methods.
2.1 Minimum Perturbation vs. Density
It is reasonable to ask why adversarial density is relevant at
all for security analysis. After all, the adversary would exploit
the weakest link, so the minimum perturbation size εmin is
perhaps the only quantity of interest. We present concrete
instances where adversarial density is relevant.
First, we point to randomized smoothing as a defense tech-
nique, which has provable guarantees of adversarial robust-
ness [10,11,26,53]. The defense uses a “smoothed” classifier
g that averages the behavior of a given neural net f (called
the base classifier) around a given input x. More specifically,
given a base classifier f , the procedure samples perturbations
of x within ε from a specific noise distribution and outputs the
most likely class c such that argmaxc∈Y Pr[ f (x+ε) = c]. No-
tice that this procedure computes the probability of f return-
ing class c—typically by counting how often f predicts class
c over many samples—rather than considering the "worst-
case" example around x. Said another way, these approaches
estimate the adversarial density for each output class under
some input distribution. Therefore, when selecting between
x
εmin
x
εmin
Figure 1: The decision boundaries of two binary classifiers f1
(left) and f2 (right) around an input x are shown. The correct
classification region for x is shown in purple (solid), while
the incorrect classification region is shown in red (hashed).
The concentric circles show the equi-distant points from x in
L2-norm drawn upto a bound ε. The classifier f1 has a better
(larger) minimim perturbation than f2, but has a worse (larger)
adversarial density because a majority of points within ε dis-
tance of x are in the incorrect classification region. Therefore,
the smoothened version of f2 will classify x correctly, while
the smoothened f1 will not. Picking the base classifier with the
better adversarial density, rather than minimum perturbation,
will lead to better accuracy in a smoothening defense.
two base classifiers during training, we should pick the one
with the smallest adversarial density for the correct class, ir-
respective of their minimum adversarial perturbation size.
To illustrate this point, in Figure 1 we show two DNNs
f1 and f2, as potential candidates for the base classifier in a
randomized smoothing procedure. Notice that f1 has a better
(larger) εmin than f2. However, more of the inputs within the
ε-ball of the input x (inside the red hashed circle) are clas-
sified as the wrong label by f1 in comparison to f2. Thus, a
smoothed classifier with f1 as a base classifier would mis-
classify x where the smoothed classifier with base f2 would
classify correctly. This explains why we should choose the
classifier with the smaller adversarial density rather than one
based on the minimum perturbation because the smoothing
process is not susceptible to worst-case examples by its very
construction. This motivates why computing adversarial den-
sity is useful for adversarial robustness defenses.
Second, we point out that estimating minimal perturba-
tion bounds has been a difficult problem. Attack procedures,
which provide an upper bound for εmin, are constantly evolv-
ing. This makes robustness evaluations attack-specific and
a moving target. On the other hand, qualitative verification
techniques can certify that the DNN has no adversarial exam-
ples below a certain perturbation, which is a lower bound on
the adversarial perturbation [12, 22, 39, 47]. However, these
analyses do not scale well with deep networks and can lead
either to timeouts or inconclusive results for large real-world
DNNs. Furthermore, they are white-box, requiring access to
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the model internals and work only for deterministic neural
networks. We show in this work that verifying adversarial
density bounds is easy to compute even for large DNNs. We
describe procedures that require only black-box access, the
ability to sample from desired distributions and hence are
attack-agnostic.
In particular, we show an empirical attack-agnostic met-
ric for estimating robustness of a given DNN and input x
called adversarial hardness. It is highest perturbation bound
for which the adversarial density is below a suitably low
θ. We can search empirically for the highest perturbation
bound εHard, called the adversarial hardness, for which a
sound quantitative certifier says ‘Yes’ when queried with
( f ,x,εHard,θ,δ,η)—implying that f has suitably low density
of adversarial examples for perturbation bounds below εHard.
Adversarial hardness is a measure of the difficulty of find-
ing an adversarial example by uniform sampling. Surprisingly,
we find that this measure strongly correlates with perturbation
bounds produced by prominent white-box attacks (see Sec-
tion 7). Given this strong correlation, we can effectively use
adversarial hardness as a proxy for perturbation sizes obtained
from specific attacks, when comparing the relative robustness
of two DNNs.
We caution readers that adversarial hardness is a quantita-
tive measure and technically different from εmin, the distance
to the nearest adversarial example around x. But both these
measures provide complementary information about the con-
centration of adversarial examples near a perturbation size.
3 Problem Definition
We are given a neural network and a space of its inputs over
which we want to assert a desirable property ψ of the outputs
of the network. Our framework allows one to check whether
ψ is true for some specified ratio θ of all possible values in
the specified space of inputs. For instance, one can check
whether most inputs, a sufficiently small number of inputs,
or any other specified constant ratio of the inputs satisfies ψ.
The specified ratio parameter θ is called a threshold.
Formally, let ψ(I , f ,Φ) ∈ {0,1} be a property function
over a neural network f , a subset of all possible inputs, I ,
to the neural network and user-specified parameters, Φ. We
assume that we can efficiently draw samples from any proba-
bility distribution over I that the analyst desires. For a given
distribution D over I , let pD = Ex∼D[ψ(x, f ,Φ)]. pD can be
viewed as the probability that ψ evaluates to 1 for x sampled
from I according to D. When clear from context, we omit D
and simply use p to refer to pD.
Ideally, one would like to design an algorithm that returns
‘Yes’ if p≤ θ and ’No’ otherwise. Such exact quantification
is intractable, so we are instead interested an algorithm A that
returns ‘Yes’ if p≤ θ and ’No’ otherwise, with two control-
lable approximation parameters (η,δ). The procedure should
be theoretically sound, ensuring that when it produces ‘Yes’
or ‘No’ results, it is correct with probability at least 1− δ
within an additive bound on its error η from the specified
threshold θ. Specifically, we say that algorithm A is sound if:
Pr[A(ψ,θ,η,δ) returns Yes | p≤ θ]≥ 1−δ
Pr[A(ψ,θ,η,δ) returns No | p > θ+η]≥ 1−δ
The analyst has arbitrary control over the confidence δ
about A’s output correctness and the precision η around the
threshold. These values can be made arbitrarily small ap-
proaching zero, increasing the runtime of A . The soundness
guarantee is useful—it rigorously estimates how many inputs
in I satisfy ψ, serving as a quantitative metric of satisfiability.
The presented framework makes very few assumptions. It
can work with any specification of I , as long as there is an
interface to be able to sample from it (as per any desired dis-
tribution) efficiently. The neural network f can be any deter-
ministic function. In fact, it can be any “stateless” randomized
procedure, i.e., the function evaluated on a particular input
does not use outputs produced from prior inputs. This gen-
eral class of neural networks includes, for instance, Bayesian
neural networks [18] and many other ensembles of neural net-
work architectures [3]. The framework permits specifying all
properties of fairness, privacy, and robustness highlighted in
recent prior work [2, 32], for a much broader class of DNNs.
Our goal is to present sound and scalable algorithms for
quantitative verification, specifically targeting empirical per-
formance for quantitatively certifying robustness of DNNs.
The framework assumes black-box access to f , which can
be deterministic or non-deterministic. Our techniques can
directly check qualitative certificates produced from random-
ized robustness-enhancing defenses, one example of which is
the recent work called PixelDP [26] (see Section 7.3).
4 Approach Overview
4.1 Sampling
Given a property ψ over a samplable input space I and a
neural network f , our approach works by sampling N times
independently from I . We test f on each sample as input. Let
Xi be a 0-1 random variable denoting the result of the trial
with sample i, where Xi = 1 if the ψ(x, f ,Φ) is true and Xi = 0
otherwise. Let X be the random variable denoting the number
of trials in X1,X2, . . . ,XN for which the property is true. Then,
the standard Chernoff bounds (see [30]) given below form the
main workhorse underlying our algorithms:
Lemma 4.1 Given independent 0-1 random variables
X1, . . . ,XN , let X = ∑Ni=1 Xi, µ =
E[X ]
N , and pˆ =
X
N . For 0 <
4
η< 1:
Pr[pˆ≥ µ+η]≤ e−Nη
2
3µ
Pr[pˆ≤ µ−η]≤ e−Nη
2
2µ
Note that the probability p we are interested in bound-
ing in our quantitative verification framework is exactly µ
in Lemma 4.1. More specifically, the probability depends
on the neural network and distribution over the inputs, p =
Ex∼D[ψ(x, f ,Φ)], where D is a distribution over I . Using a
framework based on sampling and Chernoff bounds admits
considerable generality. The only assumption in applying the
Lemma 4.1 is that all samples are independent. If the neural
network does not compute information during one trial (or
execution under one sample) and use it in another trial, as is
the case for all neural networks we study, trials will be inde-
pendent. For any deterministic neural network, all samples are
drawn independently and identically distributed in I , so Cher-
noff bounds are applicable. For randomized DNNs, we can
think of the ith trial as evaluating a potentially different neural
network (sampled from some distribution of functions) on the
given sample. Here, the output random variables may not be
identically distributed due to the randomization used by the
neural network itself. However, Lemma 4.1 can still be used
even for non-identically distributed trials but independent.
We discuss an estimation-based strategy that applies Cher-
noff bounds in a straight-forward manner next. Such a solution
has high sample complexity for quantitative verification of
adversarial robustness. We then propose hypothesis-based
solutions which are sound and have much better empirical
sample complexity for real-world DNNs. Our proposed al-
gorithms still rely only on Chernoff-style bounds, but are
carefully designed to internally vary parameters (on which
Chernoff bounds are invoked) to reduce the number of sam-
ples needed to dispatch the asserted property.
4.2 An Estimation-based Solution
One way to quantitatively verify a property through sampling
is to directly apply Chernoff bounds to the empirical estimate
of the mean pˆ in N trials. The solution is to take N >
12·ln 1δ
η2
samples, and decide ‘Yes’ if pˆ≤ θ+ η2 and ‘No’ if pˆ > θ+ η2 .
This is a common estimation approach, for instance used
in the prediction step in the certified defense mechanism
PixelDP [26]. By Lemma 4.1, one can show that pˆ is within
±η2 additive error of p with confidence higher than 1− δ.
Therefore, the procedure is sound since Pr[p 6∈ [pˆ− η2 , pˆ+η
2 )]≤ δ by Lemma 4.1, for all 0≤ p≤ 1.
In this solution, the number of samples increase quadrat-
ically with decreasing η. For example, if the θ = 0.1,η =
10−3,δ = 0.01, directly applying Chernoff bounds will re-
quire over 55×106 samples. Even for an optimized architec-
ture such as BranchyNet [44] that reports 70.9 ms on average
Algorithm 1 METAPROVERO (θ,η,δ)
1: while cond do
2: pick θ1 < θ2 ≤ θ
3: ans = TESTER (θ1,θ2,δ)
4: if ans == Yes then return Yes
5: pick θ2 > θ1 ≥ θ+η
6: ans = TESTER (θ1,θ2,δ)
7: if ans == No then return No
8: return TESTER (θ,θ+η)
Algorithm 2 TESTER (θ1,θ2,δ)
1: N = (
√
3θ1+
√
2θ2)2
(θ2−θ1)2 ln
1
δ
2: η1 = (θ2−θ1)
(
1+
√
2
3
θ2
θ1
)−1
3: η2 = θ2−θ1−η1
4: sample N times
5: pˆ = 1N ∑
n
i=1 Xi . Xi - samples that satisfy the property
6: if pˆ≤ θ1+η1 then return Yes
7: if pˆ > θ2−η2 then return No
8: return None
inference time per sample for a ResNet (152 layers) the esti-
mation approach would take more than 8 days on GPU clus-
ters (such as our evaluation platform). This is a prohibitive
cost. For randomized DNNs, which internally compute ex-
pectations, the runtime of the estimation baseline approach
can be even larger. For example, the randomization used in
PixelDP can have 3−42× inference overhead compared to
deterministic DNNs [26].
Our work provides new algorithms that utilize much fewer
samples on average. In the example of BranchyNet mentioned
above, if the true probability p is 0.3, our approach requires
4246 samples to return a ‘No’ answer with confidence greater
than 0.99. The main issue with the estimation algorithm is that
it does not utilize the knowledge of the given θ in deciding
the number of samples it needs.
4.3 Our Approach
The number of samples needed for Chernoff bounds depend
on how far is the true probability p that we are trying to
bound from the given threshold θ. Intuitively, if p and θ are
far apart in the interval [0,1], then a small number of samples
are sufficient to conclude with high certainty that p≤ θ or p>
θ+η (for small η). The estimation approach takes the same
number of samples irrespective of how far p and θ are. Our
algorithms terminate quickly by checking for “quick-to-test”
hypothesis early, yielding the sample complexity comparable
to the estimation only in the worst case.
We propose new algorithms, the key idea of which is to
use cheaper (in sample complexity) hypothesis tests to decide
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proving hypotheses refuting hypotheses
0 1
p≤ θ p > θ+η
θ1 p θ2 θ1 θ2
Figure 2: PROVERO high-level approach is based on picking
hypotheses (H1 : p ≤ θ1,H2 : p > θ2) on both sides of the
threshold θ and deciding based on sampling if p≤ θ.
‘Yes’ or ‘No’ early. Given the threshold θ and the error η,
the high-level idea is to propose alternative hypotheses on
the left side of θ and on the right side of θ+η. We choose
the hypotheses and a sampling procedure such that if any
of the hypotheses on the left side of θ are true, then we can
return ‘Yes’. Similarly, if any of the hypotheses on the right
side of θ+η are true, then we can return ‘No’. Thus, we can
potentially return much faster when p is further from θ.
The overall meta-level structure of our algorithms is simple
and follows Algorithm 1, called METAPROVERO. We pick
certain number of samples, estimate the ratio pˆ (by invoking
TESTER in lines 3 and 6), and check if we can prove that
conditions involving certain intermediate thresholds (θ1 and
θ2) are satisfied with the desired input parameters (η,δ) using
Chernoff bounds. If the check succeeds, the algorithm can
return ‘Yes’ or ‘No’; otherwise, the process repeats until a
condition which guarantees soundness is met.
The internal thresholds are picked so as to soundly prove
or refute that p lies in certain ranges in [0,1]. This is done by
testing certain intervals p is (or is not) in. For instance, line 3
tests a pair of hypotheses p≤ θ1 and p > θ2 simultaneously.
Notice that for the intervals on the left side of θ (θ1 < θ2 ≤ θ,
line 2 in Alg. 1) can result in proving that p≤ θ1 with desired
confidence δ and error tolerance η. In this case, since θ1 < θ,
we will have proved the original hypothesis p ≤ θ and the
algorithm can return ‘Yes’ soundly. We call such intervals,
which are to the left of θ, as proving intervals. Conversely,
refuting intervals are on the right side of θ+η, such as the
choice of θ1 and θ2 on line 5 in Alg. 1, which are larger than
θ+η. When we can prove that p > θ2 then we can soundly
return ‘No’, because θ2 > θ+η then implies p > θ+η.
The key building block of this algorithm is the TESTER sub-
procedure (Algorithm 2), which employs samples to check hy-
potheses. Informally, the TESTER does the following: Given
two intermediate thresholds, θ1 and θ2, if the true probability
p is either smaller than θ1 or greater than θ2, it returns ‘Yes’
or ‘No’ respectively with high confidence. If p∈ (θ1,θ2) then
the tester does not have any guarantees. Notice that a single
invocation of the TESTER checks two hypotheses simulta-
neously, using one set of samples. The number of samples
needed are derived and proven sufficient in Section 5.2.
One can directly invoke TESTER with θ1 = θ and θ2 =
θ+η but that might lead to a very large number of samples,
O(1/η2). Thus, the key challenge is to judiciously call the
TESTER on hypotheses with smaller sample complexity such
that we can refute or prove faster in most cases. To this end,
notice that METAPROVERO leaves out two algorithmic design
choices: stopping conditions and the strategy for choosing
the proving and refuting hypotheses (highlighted in Alg. 1).
We propose and analyze an adaptive binary-search-style algo-
rithm where we change our hypotheses based on the outcomes
of our sampling tests (Section 5.1). We show that our proposed
algorithm using this strategy is sound. When p is extremely
close to θ, these algorithms are no worse than estimating the
probability, requiring roughly the same number of samples.
We defer the theoretical sample complexity analysis of our al-
gorithm in Appendix A and focus on the empirical evaluation
in the paper.
5 Algorithms
We provide an adaptive algorithm for quantitative certifica-
tion that narrows the size of the intervals in the proof search,
similar to a binary-search strategy (Section 5.1). This algo-
rithm build on the base TESTER primitive which we explain
in Section 5.2.
5.1 The BINPCERTIFY Algorithm
We propose an algorithm BINPCERTIFY (Algorithm 3) where
instead of fixing the intervals beforehand we narrow our
search by halving the intervals. The user-specified input pa-
rameters for BINPCERTIFY are the threshold θ, the error
bound η and the confidence parameter δ. The interval cre-
ation strategy is off-loaded to the CREATEINTERVAL proce-
dure outlined in Algorithm 4. The interval size α is initially
set to the largest possible as TESTER would require less sam-
ples on wider intervals (Algorithm 4, lines 1-3). Then, the
BINPCERTIFY algorithm calls internally the procedure CRE-
ATEINTERVAL to create proving intervals (on the left side of
θ, Alg. 3, line 6) and refuting intervals (on the right side of
θ+η, Alg. 3, line 11). Note that for the refuting intervals,
we keep the left-side fixed, θ1 = θ+η and for the proving
intervals we keep the right-side fixed, i.e., θ2 = θ . For each
iteration of BINPCERTIFY, the strategy we use is to halve
the intervals by moving the outermost thresholds closer to θ
(Alg. 4, lines 5-7). For these intermediate hypotheses, TESTER
checks if it can prove or disprove the assert p ≤ θ (lines 9
and 15). It continues to do so alternating the proving and
refuting hypotheses until the size of both intervals becomes
smaller than the error bound η (line 16). If only on one side of
the threshold CREATEINTERVAL returns intervals with size
α> η, BINPCERTIFY checks those hypotheses. If the size of
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the proving and refuting intervals returned by CREATEINTER-
VAL is η, then the final check is directly invoked on (θ,θ+η)
and returned to the user (line 18).
The algorithm BINPCERTIFY returns ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ with
soundness guarantees as defined in Section 3. We give our
main theorem here and defer the proof to Section 6.1:
Theorem 5.1 For an unknown value p ∈ [0,1], a given
threshold θ ∈ [0,1],η ∈ (0,1),δ ∈ (0,1], BINPCERTIFY re-
turns a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ with the following guarantees:
Pr[BINPCERTIFY returns Yes | p≤ θ]≥ 1−δ
Pr[BINPCERTIFY returns No | p > θ+η]≥ 1−δ
We say that the BINPCERTIFY fails or returns incorrect
results if:
(BINPCERTIFY does not return ‘Yes’ | p≤ θ)∨
(BINPCERTIFY does not return ‘No’ | p > θ+η)
Algorithm 3 BINPCERTIFY (θ,η,δ)
1: θ1l = θ2l = 0
2: θ1r = θ2r = 0
3: n = 3+max(0, log( θη ))+max(0, log(
1−θ−η
η ))
4: δmin = δ/n . minimum confidence per call to TESTER
5: while True do
6: θ1l ,θ2l = CREATEINTERVAL(θ,θ1l ,θ2l ,η, True)
7: if θ2l −θ1l > η then
8: interval = (θ1l ,θ2l )
9: ans = TESTER(interval, δmin)
10: if ans == Yes then return Yes
11: θ1r ,θ2r = CREATEINTERVAL(θ,θ1r ,θ2r ,η, False)
12: interval = (θ1r ,θ2r )
13: if θ2r −θ1r > η then
14: ans = TESTER(interval, δmin)
15: if ans == No then return No
16: if θ2r −θ1r ≤ η and θ2l −θ1l ≤ η then
17: interval = (θ,θ+η)
18: return TESTER(interval, δmin)
Algorithm 4 CREATEINTERVAL (θ,θ1,θ2,η, left)
1: if θ== 0 and left then return (θ,θ+η)
2: if θ1 == 0 and θ2 == 0 and left then: return (0,θ)
3: if θ1 == 0 and θ2 == 0 and not left then: return (θ+
η,1)
4: α= θ2−θ1
5: if left then
6: return (θ2 - max(η,α/2), θ2)
7: return (θ1,θ1 + max(η,α/2))
5.2 TESTER Primitive
The tester takes as input two thresholds θ1,θ2 such that θ1 <
θ2 and confidence parameter δ and returns ‘Yes’ when p≤ θ1
with confidence higher than 1− δ and ‘No’ when p > θ2
with confidence higher than 1−δ. If p ∈ (θ1,θ2] the TESTER
returns without guarantees.
The procedure for implementing the TESTER is simple.
Following the procedure outlined in Algorithm 2, we take
N = (
√
3θ1+
√
2θ2)2
(θ2−θ1)2 ln
1
δ number of independent samples and
estimate the ratio of these 0-1 trials as pˆ. The TESTER returns
‘Yes’ if pˆ≤ θ1+η1 and ‘No’ if pˆ > θ2−η2 where η1 and η2
are error parameters (lines 2 and 3). If θ1+η1 < pˆ < θ2−η2,
our implementation returns ’None’. The following lemma
establishes the soundness of the tester, and follows directly
from applying Chernoff bounds on pˆ.
Lemma 5.2 Given the thresholds (θ1,θ2) and confidence pa-
rameter δ, TESTER has following soundness guarantees:
Pr[TESTER returns ‘Yes’ | p≤ θ1]≥ 1−δ
Pr[TESTER returns ‘No’ | p > θ2]≥ 1−δ
We say that the TESTER fails or returns incorrect results if:
(TESTER does not return ‘Yes’ | p≤ θ1)∨
(TESTER does not return ‘No’ | p > θ2)
Proof. We show that the failure probability for the TESTER
is bounded by δ. Given that TESTER sets η1 = (θ2 −
θ1)
√
3θ1√
3θ1+
√
2θ2
and N = (
√
3θ1+
√
2θ2)2
(θ2−θ1)2 ln
1
δ , we can directly sub-
stitute in Lemma 4.1 to derive the failure probability that the
tester does not return ‘Yes’ given p≤ θ1:
Pr[pˆ≥ θ1+η1]≤ e
− (
√
3θ1+
√
2θ2)
2
(θ2−θ1)2
3θ1(θ2−θ1)2
(
√
3θ1+
√
2θ2)2
ln 1δ
3θ1 = δ
Similarly, we bound the failure probability for TESTER
returning ‘No’ given that p > θ2 for η2 = θ2− θ1−η1 =
(θ2 − θ1)
√
2θ2√
3θ1+
√
2θ2
and N = (
√
3θ1+
√
2θ2)2
(θ2−θ1)2 ln
1
δ , we can di-
rectly substitute in Lemma 4.1 and obtain Pr[pˆ≤ θ2−η2]≤ δ.
We have shown that TESTER error probability is bounded by
δ, which proves Lemma 5.2. 
We present a detailed analysis of how we select the specific
values of the internal parameters (η1,η2,N) for TESTER in
Section 6.2.
6 Soundness
In this section, we prove that our proposed algorithm satisfies
soundness as defined in Section 3. The algorithm returns ‘Yes’
given that p≤ θ or ‘No’ given that p > θ+η with probability
at least 1−δ. We say that the algorithm fails if it returns ‘Yes’
when p > θ+η or ‘No’ when p≤ θ.
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BINPCERTIFY uses the TESTER primitive on certain in-
tervals in sequence. Depending on strategy, the size of the
intervals and the order of testing them differs. But, the al-
gorithm terminates immediately if the TESTER returns ‘Yes’
on a proving interval or ‘No’ on a refuting one. The meta-
algorithm captures this structure on line 2-5 and BINPCER-
TIFY algorithm instantiates this general structure. When none
of these optimistic calls to TESTER are successful, the algo-
rithm makes a call to the TESTER on the remaining interval in
the worst case. Given the same basic structure of algorithms
as per the meta-algorithm METAPROVERO, we now prove the
following key theorem:
Lemma 6.1 Let E be the event that the algorithm A ∈
{BINPCERTIFY} fails, then Pr[E]≤ δ.
Proof. Let the algorithm under analysis be A , which can
either BINPCERTIFY or some other strategy that follows the
METAPROVERO structure. Fix any input to A , and consider
the execution of A under those inputs. Without loss of gener-
ality, we can order the intervals tested by A in the sequence
that A invokes the TESTER on them in that execution. Let
the sequence of intervals be numbered from 1, . . . , i, for some
value i.
Now, let us bound the probability of the event Ei, which is
when A tests intervals 1, . . . , i and fails. To do so, we consider
events associated with each invocation of TESTER j ∈ [1, i].
Let R j be the event that A returns immediately after invoking
the TESTER on the j-th interval. Let C j denote the event that
TESTER returns a correct answer for the j-th interval. If Ei
is true, then A terminates immediately after testing the i-th
interval and fails. This event happens only if two conditions
are met: First, A did not return immediately after testing
intervals 1, . . . , i−1; and second, A returns a wrong answer
at i-th interval and does terminate. Therefore, we can conclude
that the event Ei = C¯i∩Ri∩ R¯i−1∩ . . .∩ R¯1. The probability
of failure Pr[Ei] for each event Ei is upper bounded by Pr[C¯i].
Lastly, let E be the total failure probability of A . We can
now use a union bound over possible failure events E1, . . . ,En,
where n is the maximum number of intervals A can possibly
test under any given input. Specifically:
Pr[E] = Pr[E1∪E2 . . .∪En]≤
n
∑
i=1
Pr[Ei]≤
n
∑
i=1
Pr[C¯i]
By analyzing ∑ni=1 Pr[C¯i] in the context of each of our spe-
cific algorithm BINPCERTIFY, we show that the quantity is
bounded by δ. Specifically, we invoke Lemma 6.2 presented
in Section 6.1 to bound ∑ni=1 Pr[C¯i] below δ for our adaptive
algorithm. 
6.1 Proof of Soundness: BINPCERTIFY
Lemma 6.1 directly implies Theorem 5.1. It remains to prove
the required Lemma 6.2 that is invoked by Lemma 6.1 to
establish the soundness of BINPCERTIFY.
Lemma 6.2 Under any given input (θ,η,δ), let Ci be the
event that i-th call made by BINPCERTIFY to the TESTER is
correct and let n be the total number of calls to TESTER by
BINPCERTIFY. Then, ∑ni=1 Pr[C¯i]≤ δ.
Proof. BINPCERTIFY halves the size of the intervals after
each iteration until the intervals become smaller than the η.
On the left side of θ, it initially starts with an interval of
size θ (line 2 in Alg. 4). As a result we can upper bound the
number of proving intervals by nl ≤ 1+ log θη . Similarly, for
the right side of θ+η, number of refuting intervals is nr ≤
1+ log 1−θ−ηη . Lastly, there is only 1 call to the TESTER on
the interval η (line 19, Alg. 3). The total number of intervals
tested in any one execution of BINPCERTIFY is at most n =
3+ log θη + log
1−θ−η
η . Each call to the TESTER is done with
confidence parameter δmin = δn , therefore by Lemma 5.2, the
failure probability of any call is at most δn . It follows:
n
∑
i=1
Pr[C¯i]≤ n · δn = δ

6.2 TESTER Analysis
In this section, we show a detailed analysis of deriving the
number of samples N = (
√
3θ1+
√
2θ2)2
(θ2−θ1)2 ln
1
δ and η1,η2 param-
eters of the TESTER such that TESTER satisfies the sound-
ness guarantees as outlined in Section 5.2. We denote the
number of samples Xi for which ψ holds as X = ∑Ni=1 Xi and
pˆ = 1N ∑
N
i=1 Xi as the estimated probability after N samples.
Using the estimated pˆ, TESTER returns ‘Yes’ if pˆ≤ θ1+η1
and ‘No’ if pˆ ≥ θ2−η2 with probability greater than 1−δ.
Otherwise, it returns ‘None’. In other words, given that p≤ θ1
we need to show that if TESTER takes n samples it fails the
check on line 6 in Alg. 2 with a bounded failure probability
of δ. Likewise, given that p > θ2 we need to show that the
failure probability of the check on line 7 in Alg. 2 is bounded
by δ. We want to choose values η1,η2 ∈ (0,1) such that:
Pr[pˆ≥ θ1+η1 | p≤ θ1]≤ δ
Pr[pˆ≤ θ2−η2 | p > θ2]≤ δ
The key idea is to use one set of samples to check two
hypotheses, p≤ θ1 and p > θ2, simultaneously. To do so, we
find a point t ∈ (θ1,θ2) which we can serve as a decision
boundary for pˆ. Specifically, consider the value t such that:
t = θ1+η1 = θ2−η2 (1)
We choose t and the number of samples n in such a way
that estimated pˆ is unlikely (with probability less than δ) to
be exceeding θ1 +η1 if p ≤ θ1 and to be less than θ2−η2
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Figure 3: TESTER considers the boundary t = θ1 + η1 =
θ2−η2 that allows to distinguish p≤ θ1 or p > θ2.
if p > θ2. We illustrate this in Figure 3: it shows (t,η1,η2)
and the two probability distributions for pˆ given p = θ1 and
p= θ2, respectively. The distributions for the case p< θ1 will
be shifted further to the left, and the case p> θ2 will be shifted
further to the right; so these are are extremal distributions to
consider. It can be seen that t is chosen such that Pr[pˆ >
t|p ≤ θ1] as well as Pr[pˆ < t|p > θ2] are bounded (shaded
red) by probability δ . Next, we show how to find such a t that
requires smallest n when using Chernoff bounds.
Using the additive Chernoff bounds (Lemma 4.1), for a
given θ1 and θ2, we can use the number of samples N is the
maximum of the two quantities below:
N ≥ 3θ1 1η21
ln
1
δ
(2)
N ≥ 2θ2 1η22
ln
1
δ
(3)
Taking the maximum ensures that the probabilities of the
both the hypotheses, p < θ1 and p > θ2, are being simultane-
ously upper bounded. From Eq. 1 we can express η2 in terms
of θ1,θ2,η1 as η2 = θ2−θ1−η1. This allows us to express
the required number of samples as functions of the input pa-
rameters (θ1,θ2,δ) and one variable η1. More specifically,
for Eq. 2 and Eq. 3, we obtain the functions g1 and g2:
g1(θ1,η1,δ) = 3θ1
1
η21
ln
1
δ
g2(θ1,θ2,η1,δ) = 2θ2
1
(θ2−θ1−η1)2 ln
1
δ
Since the number of samples required must be max(g1,g2),
we find the η1 at which max(g1,g2) is the least. Since g2 is a
monotonically decreasing function in η1 and g1 is a monoton-
ically increasing function in η1, the minima of max(g1,g2) is
reached when the two bounds are equal. Thus the minimum
N is found at the following value of η1:
η1 = (θ2−θ1)
√
3θ1√
3θ1+
√
2θ2
By fixing η1, we have fixed our choice of t to θ1 + η1.
Substituting η1 into Eq. 2 gives us the number of samples N =
Table 1: Neural network architectures used in our evaluation.
Dataset Arch Description #HiddenUnits
MNIST(BM1)
FFNN 6-layer feed-forward 3010
convSmall 2-layer convolutional 3604
convMed 3-layer convolutional 4804
convBig 6-layer convolutional 34688
convSuper 6-layer convolutional 88500
skip residual 71650
ImageNet (BM2)
VGG16 16-layer convolutional 15,086,080
VGG19 19-layer convolutional 16,390,656
ResNet50 50-layer residual 36,968,684
Inception_v3 42-layer convolutional 32,285,184
DenseNet121 121-layer convolutional 49,775,084
(
√
3θ1+
√
2θ2)2
(θ2−θ1)2 ln
1
δ . The sufficiency of these parameter values
is proven in Lemma 5.2.
7 Evaluation
• Scalability: How large are the models PROVERO can
work within a reasonable timeout? In comparable time-
out, can qualitative analysis tools produce conclusive
results for such models?
• Utility in attack evaluations: How does adversarial hard-
ness computed with PROVERO compare with the efficacy
of state-of-the-art attacks?
• Applicability to randomized models: Can PROVERO cer-
tify properties of randomized DNNs?
• Performance. How many samples are needed by our new
algorithms compare to the estimation approach (Sec-
tion 4.2)?
We implement our algorithms in a prototype tool called
PROVERO and evaluate the robustness of 38 deterministic
neural networks trained on 2 datasets: MNIST [25] and Im-
ageNet [37]. For MNIST, we evaluate on 100 images from
the model’s respective test set. In the case of ImageNet, we
pick from the validation set as we require the correct label.
Table 1 provides the size statistics of these models. In addi-
tion, we evaluate the randomized model publicly provided by
PixelDP [26], which has a qualitative certificate of robustness
as well.
ERAN Benchmark (BM1). Our first benchmark consists
of 33 moderate size neural networks trained on the MNIST
dataset. These are selected to aid a comparison with a state-of-
the-art qualitative verification framework called ERAN [39].
We selected all the models which ERAN reported on. These
models range from 2-layer neural networks to 6-layer neural
networks with up to about 90K hidden units. We use the
images used to evaluate the ERAN tool2.
2available to download from https://github.com/eth-sri/eran
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Larger Models (BM2). The second benchmark consists of 5
larger deep-learning models pretrained on ImageNet: VGG16,
VGG19, ResNet50, InceptionV3 and DenseNet121. The pre-
trained models were obtained via the Keras framework with
Tensorflow backend. These have about 15− 50M hidden
units.
All experiments were run on GPU (Tesla V100-SXM2-
16GB) with a timeout of 600 seconds per image for the
MNIST, 2000 seconds for ImageNet models, and 3600 sec-
onds for the randomized PixelDP model.
7.1 Utility in Attack Evaluation
PROVERO can be used to directly certify if the security analyst
has a threshold they want to check, for example, obtained from
an external specification. Another way to understand its utility
is by relating the quantitative bounds obtained from PROVERO
with those reported by specific attacks. When comparing the
relative robustness of DNNs to adversarial attacks, a com-
mon evaluation methodology today is to find the minimum
adversarial perturbation with which state-of-the-art attacks
can produce at least one successful adversarial example. If
the best known attacks perform worse on one DNN versus
another, on a sufficiently many test inputs, then the that DNN
is considered more robust.
PROVERO offers a new capability: we can measure the ratio
of adversarial samples within a specified perturbation bound
of a given test input x (see Section 2). Specifically, we can
compute the adversarial density by uniformly sampling in the
Lp ball of x, and checking if the ratio of adversarial samples
is very small (below θ = 10−3). By repeating this process
for different perturbations bounds, we empirically determine
the adversarial hardness (or εHard)—the largest perturbation
bound below which PROVERO certifies the adversarial density
to be that small (returns ‘Yes’) and above which PROVERO
does not (returns ‘No’). We use density threshold θ= 10−3,
error tolerance η= 10−3, and confidence parameter δ= 0.01.
PROVERO computes the adversarial hardness with black-
box access. As a comparison point, we evaluate against two
white-box attacks — PGD [29] for L∞ and C&W [8] for L2
implemented in CleverHans [33] (v3.0.1) — 2 prominent at-
tacks that are recommended for the Lp norms we consider [6].
White-box attacks enable the attacker complete access to in-
ternals; therefore, they are empirically more powerful than
black-box attacks today. Both PGD and C&W are gradient-
based adversarial attacks. For PGD, we perform 30 attacks
on different values of ε to identify the minimum value that
an adversarial input can be identified. For C&W, we identify
the best ε it is able to identify for a given amount of resource
(iterations).
Result 1. Our main empirical result in this experiment is that
εHard is strongly correlated with εmin. Figure 4 and Figure 5
show the correlation visually for two models: it shows that the
perturbation bounds found by these two separate attacks are
Table 2: Attack correlation for the PGD and C&W attack for
the models in BM1 and BM2 using Pearson’s coefficient (ρ).
For all, statistical significance p < 0.01.
Models ρ (PGD) ρ (C&W)
convBigRELU__DiffAI 0.9617 0.7509
convMedGRELU__PGDK_w_0.1 0.8143 0.6686
convMedGRELU__PGDK_w_0.3 0.7699 0.6715
convMedGRELU__Point 0.8461 0.982
convMedGSIGMOID__PGDK_w_0.1 0.8533 0.8903
convMedGSIGMOID__PGDK_w_0.3 0.9394 0.913
convMedGSIGMOID__Point 0.9424 0.9605
convMedGTANH__PGDK_w_0.1 0.9521 0.9334
convMedGTANH__PGDK_w_0.3 0.9567 0.8718
convMedGTANH__Point 0.7592 0.9817
convSmallRELU__DiffAI 0.9504 0.5127
convSmallRELU__PGDK 0.7803 0.6411
convSmallRELU__Point 0.893 0.9816
convSuperRELU__DiffAI 0.687 0.3856
DenseNet-res 0.7168 0.4879
ffnnRELU__PGDK_w_0.1_6_500 0.8932 0.9577
ffnnRELU__PGDK_w_0.3_6_500 0.7039 0.6496
ffnnRELU__Point_6_500 0.954 0.9788
ffnnSIGMOID__PGDK_w_0.1_6_500 0.8706 0.8955
ffnnSIGMOID__PGDK_w_0.3_6_500 0.9402 0.9201
ffnnSIGMOID__Point_6_500 0.8906 0.9489
ffnnTANH__PGDK_w_0.1_6_500 0.8156 0.9508
ffnnTANH__PGDK_w_0.3_6_500 0.9104 0.9485
ffnnTANH__Point_6_500 0.8998 0.8435
mnist_conv_maxpool 0.9664 0.9699
mnist_relu_3_100 0.9668 0.9448
mnist_relu_3_50 0.9702 0.9298
mnist_relu_4_1024 0.8945 0.9723
mnist_relu_5_100 0.7472 0.9629
mnist_relu_6_100 0.9845 0.9868
mnist_relu_6_200 0.9699 0.9412
mnist_relu_9_100 0.979 0.9725
mnist_relu_9_200 0.8165 0.9652
ResNet50 0.7929 0.6932
skip__DiffAI 0.7344 0.6298
VGG16 0.8064 0.8297
VGG19 0.7224 0.7335
Inception-v3 0.5806 0.4866
different, but both correlate with the adversarial hardness of
the certification instance produced by PROVERO. The Pearson
correlation for all models is reported in Table 2 for all cases
where the compared white-box attacks are successful The
average Pearson correlation between the perturbation found
by PGD, εPGD, and εHard over all models is 0.858 and between
the perturbation found by C&W, εC&W , and εHard is 0.8438.
We take 25 images per model to calculate the correlation. The
significance level is high (p-value is below 0.01 for all cases).
Recall that PROVERO is sound, so the estimate of adver-
sarial hardness εHard is close to the ground truth with high
probability (99%). This metric is an attack-agnostic metric,
computed by uniform sampling and without white-box ac-
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cess to the model. The strong correlation shows that PGD
and C&W attacks find smaller εmin for easier certification in-
stances, and larger εmin for harder instances. This suggests that
when comparing the robustness of two models, one can con-
sider adversarial hardness as a useful attack-agnostic metric,
complementing evaluation on specific attacks.
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Figure 4: Correlation graph between L∞ bounds provided by
PROVERO and PGD for a fully connected feedforward with
sigmoid (FFNN) on MNIST.
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Figure 5: Correlation graph between L2 bounds provided
by PROVERO and C&W for a fully connected feedforward
(FFNN) with sigmoid on MNIST.
7.2 Scalability
We test PROVERO on 38 models, which range from 3K−50M
hidden units. We select 100 input images for each model
and retain all those inputs for which the model correctly
classifies. We tested 11 perturbation size (L∞) from 0.01 to
0.25 for BM1 and 4 perturbation size (L2) from 2/255 to
14/255 for BM2. This results in a total of 36971 test images
for 38 models. We run each test image with PROVERO with
the following parameters: (θ = 0.0001,η = 0.001 and θ =
0.01,η = 0.01,δ = 0.01) (for BM1) (θ = 0.001,η = 0.001
and θ = 0.01,η = 0.01,δ = 0.01) (for BM2). We find that
PROVERO scales producing answers within the timeout of
600 seconds for BM1 and 2000 seconds for BM2 per test
image. Less than 2% input cases for BM2 and less than 5%
for BM1 return ’None’, i.e., PROVERO cannot certify con-
clusively that there are less or more than than the queried
thresholds. For all other cases, PROVERO provides a ‘Yes’ or
‘No’ results.
As a comparison point, we tried to compare with prior work
on quantitative verification [2], prototyped in a tool called
NPAQ. While NPAQ provides direct estimates rather than
the ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ answers PROVERO produces, we found that
NPAQ supports only a sub-class of neural networks (BNNs)
and of much smaller size. Hence, it cannot support or scale
for any of the models in our benchmarks, BM1 and BM2.
Secondly, we tested ERAN which is considered as the
most scalable qualitative verification tool. We failed to run
the large BM2 models. ERAN initially was not able to parse
these models. After direct correspondence with the authors of
ERAN, the authors added support for requisite input model
formats. After applying these changes, we confirmed that the
current implementation of ERAN times out on all the BM2
models. PROVERO finishes on these within a timeout of 2000
seconds.
We successfully run ERAN on BM1, which are smaller
benchmarks that ERAN reported on. There are total of 4 anal-
yses in ERAN. We evaluate on the DeepZono and DeepPoly
domains but for the DeepPoly, on our evaluation platform,
ERAN runs out of memory and could not analyze the neural
networks in BM1. The remaining analyses, RefineZono and
RefinePoly are known to achieve or improve the precision of
the DeepZono or DeepPoly domain at the cost of larger run-
ning time by calling a mixed-integer programming solver [41].
Hence, we compare with the most scalable of these 4 analyses,
namely the DeepZono domain.
Result 2. Figure 6 plots the precision of ERAN against
PROVERO for all 11 perturbation sizes. We find that for a
perturbation size of more than 0.05, ERAN’s results are in-
conclusive, i.e., the analysis reports neither ‘Yes’ nor ‘No’
for more than 50% of the inputs, likely due to imprecision
in over-approximations of the analysis. Figure 6 shows that
the verified models reduces for higher perturbations ε. This
is consistent with the findings in the ERAN paper: ERAN
either takes longer or is more imprecise for non-robust models
and higher ε values [41]. In all cases where ERAN is incon-
clusive, PROVERO successfully finishes within the 600 second
timeout for all 35431 test images and values of ε. In above
95% of these cases, PROVERO produces high-confidence ‘Yes’
or ‘No’ results.
As a sanity check, on cases where ERAN conclusively out-
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Figure 6: PROVERO and ERAN verified robustness per pertur-
bation size for BM1 for threshold θ= 0.0001, error η= 0.001
and confidence δ= 0.01.
puts a ‘Yes’, PROVERO also reports ‘Yes’. With comparable
running time, PROVERO is able to obtain quantitative bounds
for all perturbation sizes. From these experimental results,
we conclude PROVERO is a complementary analysis tool that
can be used to quantitatively certify larger models and for
larger perturbation sizes, for which our evaluated qualitative
verification framework (ERAN) is inconclusive. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first work to give any kind of
sound quantitative guarantees for such large models.
7.3 Applicability to Randomized DNNs
So far in our evaluation we have focused on deterministic
DNNs, however, PROVERO can certify the robustness of ran-
domized DNNs. To demonstrate this generality, we take a
model obtained by a training procedure called PixelDP that
adds differentially private noise to make the neural network
more robust. The inference phase of a PixelDP network uses
randomization: instead of picking the label with the maximum
probability, it samples from the noise layer and calculates an
expectation of the output value. PixelDP also produces a cer-
tified perturbation bound for which it guarantees the model
to be robust for a given input image. Note that qualitative
verification tools such as ERAN require white-box access
and work with deterministic models, so they would not be
able to verify the robustness of randomized PixelDP DNNs.
We contacted the authors to obtain the models used in Pix-
elDP [26]. The authors pointed us to the PixelDP ResNet28-
10 model trained on CIFAR10 3 as the main representative of
the technique. We randomly select 25 images in the CIFAR10
dataset and for each image we obtain the certified perturba-
tion bound εpixeld p produced by PixelDP itself. We configure
3available to download from https://github.com/columbia/
pixeldp
PixelDP to internally estimate εpixeld p using 25 samples from
the noise layer as recommended in their paper. This bound,
εPixelDP, is the maximum bound for which PixelDP claims
there are no adversarial samples within the L2 ball.
We use PROVERO to check the certificate εPixelDP produced
by PixelDP, using the following parameters θ = 0.01,η =
0.01,δ = 0.01. PROVERO reports ‘Yes’, implying that the
model has adversarial density under these bounds. Under
the same threshold θ= 10−2,η= 10−2 we tested for larger
perturbation sizes: from ε= 0.1 to 0.25.
Result 3. Our findings in this experiment are that PROVERO
can certify low adversarial density for perturbation bounds
much larger than the qualitative certificates produced by Pix-
elDP. In particular, PROVERO certifies that for ε= 5×εPixelDP,
the PixelDP model has less than 10−2 adversarial examples
with confidence at least 99%. PROVERO offers complimentary
quantitative estimates of robustness for PixelDP.
7.4 Performance
Our estimation solution outlined in Section 4.2 applies Cher-
noff bounds directly. For a given precision parameter η, it
requires a large number of samples, within a factor of 1/η2.
While we do not escape from this worst case, we show that
our proposed algorithms improve over the estimation baseline
empirically. To this end, we record the number of samples
taken for each test image and compare it to the number of
samples as computed for the estimation approach.
Result 4. We find that PROVERO requires 27× less samples
than the estimation approach for values of η= 0.01,θ= 0.01
and 687× less samples for values of η = 0.001,θ = 0.0001
for BM1. For larger models in BM2 and values of η =
0.001,θ= 0.001, PROVERO requires 74× less samples than
the estimation solution and η= 0.01,θ= 0.01.
In our implementation, we use a batch-mode to do the infer-
ence for models in BM1 and BM2, speeding up the running
time of the sampling process by a factor of 3×. This leads
to average times of 29.78 seconds per image for BM1 for
a batch size of 128. For the models in BM2 we used dif-
ferent batch sizes so we report the average time per sample
as 0.003 seconds which can be used to derive the running
time based. For (θ = 0.0001,η = 0.001) and all values of
ε, the average number of samples over all images is 80,424
(median value is 83,121, standard deviation is 14,303). For
VGG16 the average number of samples is around 657,885,
for VGG19 it is around 644,737 and for InceptionV3 664,397
samples, respectively, for θ = 0.001,η = 0.001. For both
θ = 0.01,η = 0.01 and θ = 0.001,η = 0.001, for VGG16
the average number of samples is 737,297, for VGG19 it is
722,979 and for InceptionV3 744,792 average number of
samples, resulting in about 74× less samples than the estima-
tion approach.
For the PixelDP model, PROVERO takes 20,753 samples.
Since PixelDP models internally take 25 samples from the
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noise layer, the time taken for inference on one given input
itself is higher. PROVERO reports an average running time per
test image of roughly 1,500 seconds.
8 Related Work
Qualitative Neural Network Verification. The formal veri-
fication of neural networks asks whether the neural network
satisfies a certain property, i.e., a neural network is robust if all
perturbations within a bound are correctly labeled by the neu-
ral network. The approaches following classical verification
methodology, also sometimes called qualitative verification,
focus on the design of techniques that return yes if the neural
network is robust or produce a counterexample that violates
the robustness property. In the context of deep neural net-
works, the earliest attempt to verification is due to Pulina and
Tacchela [35], which employs an abstraction-refinement tech-
nique to verify neural network safety. The recent verification
methodologies have sought to exploit the advances in combi-
natorial solving, thereby consisting of satisfiability modulo
theories (SMT) solvers-based approaches [13, 19, 22, 23, 31]
or integer linear programming approaches [9, 27, 47]. While
significant progress has been made recently to extend the
verification to convolutional layers with piecewise-linear acti-
vation function, the combinatorial solving-based approaches
typically scale to only a few layers.
Consequently, techniques to address scalability often
sacrifice completeness: abstract interpretation-based tech-
niques [14, 39–41] are among the most scalable verification
procedures that over-approximate the activation functions
with abstract domains. If the procedure returns Yes, then the
neural network is robust with respect to the particular pertur-
bation bound; otherwise, the network can be either robust or
have adversarial examples, i.e., the approach has false posi-
tives. Similarly, optimization-based approaches [12, 36, 53]
produce a certificate of robustness for a given input: a lower
bound on the minimum perturbation bound εmin such that
there are no adversarial examples within that a εmin ball.
These techniques are, however, incomplete and catered to
only ReLU activations [53] and fully-connected layers [56].
A promising line of incomplete techniques has been
proposed employing two complementary techniques: Lip-
schitz computation and linear approximations. Hein and An-
driushchenko [17] propose an analytical analysis based on the
Lipschitz constant, but the approach assumes that a differen-
tiable activation function (thus excluding ReLU activations)
and can handle only two layers. Boopathy et al [5], Weng et
al. [51], Zhang et al [56] have further improved the scalability
of techniques based on Lipschitz constants and linear approx-
imations, achieving scalability up to 80,000 hidden units.
While the lower and upper bounds are sound, their tightness
is not guaranteed. In another line of work, Weng et al. [52]
employ extreme value theory to estimate a lower bound on
εmin albeit without theoretical guarantees of the soundness of
the obtained bounds.
As discussed earlier, our work differs fundamentally from
classical verification approaches in our focus on the develop-
ment of a quantitative verification framework with rigorous
guarantees on computed estimates.
Quantitative Verification. While qualitative verification pro-
vides a binary answer to the question of whether there exists
an input that violates a property, in quantitative approaches,
the goal is to estimate what proportion of inputs violate the
property. Webb et al. [50] proposed a Monte Carlo-based ap-
proach to estimating the ratio of adversarial examples. In par-
ticular, the authors propose to use a technique that is catered
for rare event estimation. In this work, we take a property test-
ing approach wherein we ask if the proportion of inputs that
violate a property is less than a given threshold (in which case
we say yes) or it is η-far from the threshold (in which case
we say no). While both approaches are black-box and rely
on sampling, PROVERO returns a yes or no answer with user-
specified high confidence, whereas the statistical approach
proposed by Webb et al. does not provide such guarantees.
The approach of Baluta et al. [2] is similar to our work,
in spirit. Baluta et al. propose a white-box approach, called
NPAQ, by encoding the neural network into a logical formula
and employ model counting to estimate the proportion of
adversarial inputs. The lack of efficient model counters re-
stricts the authors to instantiating the approach to a particular
type of neural networks, namely binarized neural networks,
thus limiting the applicability to other types of neural net-
works. While NPAQ does provide PAC-style guarantees, its
scalability is limited to binarized neural networks of around
50,000 parameters. Narodytska et al. [32] propose a similar
approach for assessing machine learning explanations. In con-
trast, PROVERO scales to significantly larger DNNs than any
of the previous work while preserving the formal guarantees
of the white-box approach, i.e., PROVERO returns an answer
with user-specified error and confidence parameters.
9 Conclusion
We have presented a quantitative verification algorithm for
neural networks which has soundness guarantees and empiri-
cal scalability. The framework makes minimal assumptions.
We have shown its practical utility in certifying adversarial
robustness. Specifically, we present a new attack-agnostic
metric of hardness of finding adversarial examples which can
be computed using our approach and we find that correlates
well with the efficacy of 2 effective attacks today. PROVERO
provides complementary utility compared to qualitative veri-
fication tools by allowing analysts to certify DNN robustness
with high confidence efficiently.
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A Sample Complexity Analysis
We now provide an upper bound on the number of samples
required by BINPCERTIFY. Throughout the analysis, for an
interval of size α, the number of samples needed by i−th
call to the TESTER for the interval of size α is si(α,δ) ≤
(
√
3+
√
2)2
α2 ln
1
δ .
The BINPCERTIFY algorithm halves the interval size on
each iteration (call to CREATEINTERVAL, lines 6 and 11 in
Alg. 3) until the interval size for both the proving and re-
futing intervals become smaller than η. When that happens,
BINPCERTIFY calls the TESTER on the interval (θ,θ+η)
and returns directly from there, lines 16–18, Alg. 3. The CRE-
ATEINTERVAL method starts by creating intervals of size θ for
the proving intervals and 1−θ−η for the refuting intervals.
Theorem A.1 The number of samples required by BINPCER-
TIFY is upper bounded by O(k1+ k2+ k3), where
1. k1 = 43 (
1
θ2 − 1η2 )(
√
3+
√
2)2ln nδ
2. k2 = 43 (
1
θ2 − 14(1−θ−η)2 )(
√
3+
√
2)2ln nδ
3. k3 =
(
√
3θ+
√
2(θ+η))2
η2 ln
n
δ .
and n = 3+max(0, log θη )+max(0, log
1−θ−η
η ).
Proof. We shall use the notations described at the beginning
of Section A. Let Zi denote the number of samples required
by the BINPCERTIFY during the i-th iteration of the loop.
Note that BINPCERTIFY first invokes TESTER for the interval
(0,θ), therefore, we have
Z1 ≤ s1(θ,δmin)+Pr[R¯1]s2(θ2 ,δmin)
For all the rest of the iterations until the final iteration,
i.e., when the condition in line 16 is satisfied, we have the
following bounds on Zi.
Zi ≤s2i−1( θ2i−1 ,δmin)+
s2i(
1−θ−η
2i
,δmin)Pr[R¯2i−1]
Let Z f denote the number of samples by TESTER in line
18. We have Z f ≤ sn( θ2n ,δmin). Finally, observe that
Z = Z1+Pr[R¯2]Z2+Pr[R¯2(i−1)]Z3+ · · ·+Pr[R¯n−1]Z f
Also, the number of proving intervals before the last call is
nl ≤ 1+ log θη and, respectively, nr ≤ 1+ log 1−θ−ηη refuting
intervals. Therefore,
Z ≤ s1(θ,δmin)+
nl
∑
i=2
s2i−1(
θ
2i−1
,δmin)
2i−2
∏
j=1
Pr[R¯ j]+
nr
∑
i=1
s2i(
1−θ−η
2i−1
,δmin)
2i−1
∏
j=1
Pr[R¯ j]+
sn(
θ
2n
,δmin)
n−1
∏
j=1
Pr[R¯ j],
where nl ≤ 1+ log θη ,nr ≤ 1+ log
1−θ−η
η
.
The following bounds can be obtained by simple algebraic
computations:
1. ∑nli=2 s2i−1(
θ
2i−1 ,δmin)≤ 43 ( 1θ2 − 1η2 )(
√
3+
√
2)2ln 1δmin
2. ∑nri=1 s2i(
1−θ−η
2i−1 ,δmin) ≤ 43 ( 1θ2 − 14(1−θ−η)2 )(
√
3 +√
2)2ln 1δmin
16
3. sn( θ2n ,δmin) =
(
√
3θ+
√
2(θ+η))2
η2 ln
1
δmin
.
The statement of the theorem follows directly from the
above bounds and by noting Pr[R¯i]≤ 1 and δmin = δ/n 
The above analysis is conservative and an interesting direc-
tion of future work would be to analyze Pr[R¯i] under given
distribution of p.
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